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JAN VAN K U P P E V E L T
IN F E R R IN G  FR O M  TO PIC S
Scalar Implicatures as Topic-Dependent Inferences
1 .  I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
This paper focuses on the specific inferential phenomena, known as 
generalized conversational implicatures, which arise from Grice’s first sub­
maxim of Quantity (Grice 1967/75). Particular attention is paid to the 
subclass of so-called scalar implicatures (Gazdar 1979; Horn 1972). This 
subclass has been widely discussed and is recognized as the type of prag­
matic inference that has probably been most systematically accounted for. 
However, as is generally acknowledged, inferences of this type are not 
without problems, especially how they are actually generated. These prob­
lems are mainly due to the difficulty of defining adequately the notion of 
linguistic scales underlying their explanation.
Central to scale definition are the points of scale activation> scale reduc­
tion, and, in particular, scale ordering and scale coherence. As indicated 
by Harnish (1979), Hirschberg (1985) and others, the activation of scales 
must be restricted in order to avoid an overgeneration of inferences based 
on them. The second point -  scale reduction -  is probably the most 
difficult one (see, in particular, Rooth 1992). Scale reduction considers 
the contextual constraints on the (original) number of elements defining a 
scale. The much discussed point of scale ordering (see Fauconnier 1975a/b; 
Gazdar 1979; Hirschberg 1985; Horn 1972/89) refers to a general ordering 
criterion for the elements of a scale. This may be a semantic, pragmatic 
or other type of ordering. The last point -  scale coherence -  is fairly 
diverse (see Hirschberg 1985; Horn 1972/89; Levinson 1983). Problems 
observed in this respect include the hierarchy problem , which implies that 
in specific cases the elements on a scale cannot be hierarchically ordered 
without leading to incorrect scalar predictions, and the problems of scale 
overlap, scale direction and scale partitioning.
Directly related to all these problems are the point of the selection of 
a value on a scale and the context-dependency of a satisfactory selection. 
Both points relate to an adequate prediction of a scalar inference. Largely 
disregarded in the literature is the fact that the selection of a scale value
1 The research reported here was supported by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts 
and Sciences (KNAW). I also wish to thank the two anonymous referees of Linguistics and 
Philosophy for their useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Linguistics and Philosophy 19: 393-443, 1996.
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may not only consist of a unique value but also of a less specific, non­
unique value, comprising a number of scale values. Generally, in the latter 
case, no inference is generated. But the context preceding an inference- 
inducing sentence may also be such that it weakens the requirements for 
a satisfactory selection, thereby implying that no inference is induced in 
such cases either.
In this paper we propose a definition of linguistic scales in terms of a 
uniform topic notion comprising both the notion of sentence topics and 
that of topics of larger discourse units. The aim of this definition is to 
provide a solution to the problems cited above. The argument presented 
favors linguistic scales as ordered topic ranges introduced by higher-order 
or lower-order topic-forming questions, either explicit or implicit. This 
implies that the notion of linguistic scales is directly related to that of the 
segmentation structure of discourse which is considered to be in 
correspondence with the discourse-internal topic-comment structure. 
Linguistic scales thus give rise to inferences generated on different dis­
course levels. The inferences based on them are not only associated with 
single utterances, as is generally assumed, but are also generated as the 
result of larger discourse units, including those comprising the discourse 
as a whole»
The theoretical framework that underlies our proposal assumes a direct 
relationship between topics, questions and discourse structure. In Van 
Kuppevelt (1991/95a) it is hypothesized that a discourse derives its struc­
tural coherence from the internal topic-comment structure which results 
from the process of the contextual induction of explicit and implicit topic- 
forming questions, On the global level a linguistic scale is defined by the 
higher-order topic-forming question answered by a larger discourse unit. 
The inference generated on the basis of this scale is the one related to 
the whole discourse segment. On the local level, on the other hand, 
different linguistic scales and the inferences based on them can be asso­
ciated with individual sentences that answer a (sub)topic-forming question* 
We demonstrate the way in which the inferential output of scalar infer­
ences generated on the local level amounts to the scalar inference on the 
corresponding global level. We present two generalizations for computing 
such higher-order scalar inferences: one concerning the actual inducing 
context which does not necessarily coincide with the discourse unit as a 
whole, and the other, the moment o f  induction, which does not necessarily 
coincide with the moment at which the implicature inducing context is 
generated.
As to scale activation, we put forward the view that the contextual
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restrictions which hold for implicature generation are determined by the 
explicit or implicit topic-forming question answered by the implicature 
inducing discourse unit. With reference to this, we argue that contextually 
determined inferences of this type have in fact an inferential status differ­
ent to the weaker pragmatic status that is generally assumed. In this 
respect, we discuss Horn’s (1972) distinction between two kinds of elimin­
ation of a scalar implicature, and we give an adequate response to Gazdar’s 
(1979) arguments that scalar implicatures cannot be (semantic) entail- 
ments.
The definition of linguistic scales as ordered topic ranges directly pre­
sents a solution to the remaining scale problems. Scale reduction is 
analyzed as a function of the completion task of sub questions. This task 
consists of a further reduction of the original topic range defined by the 
higher-order topic-forming question, As far as an ordering criterion for 
scales is concerned, we propose a general criterion in terms of answer 
informativeness. Finally, the problem of scale-coherence, in particular the 
question of scale overlap, scale direction and scale partitioning, is ac­
counted for in terms of whether the scale values in question share the 
same topic.
The above mentioned problems directly related to scale definition are 
also accounted for in terms of topic-forming questions. The selection of 
unique or non-unique scale values is related to that of satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory answers to topic-forming questions. It is shown that the 
satisfactoriness of an answer depends, among other things, on the superor- 
dinated higher-order question. As is made clear, both points are central 
to our claim that cardinals do not, as is generally assumed, differ princi­
pally from non-cardinals with respect to the generation of scalar infer­
ences.
We will start the analysis with a brief outline of the framework that 
presents an account of hierarchical discourse structure in terms of topic- 
forming questions (Section 2). A characterization will be given of the 
question-based topic notion, the notion of atopic range that is implied by 
this and the reduction of such a range to a unique value as the result of 
the process of explicit and implicit questioning in discourse. We continue 
with the main subject of a topical account of scalar inferences in terms of 
topic-forming questions (Section 3). We first account for the view that 
scalar implicatures are in fact determined by topic-forming questions. 
Thereafter, we explain the notion of linguistic scales as ordered topic 
ranges. Finally, an account is given of the generation of scalar inferences 
on different discourse levels.
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2 .  T o p i c a l i t y  a n d  Q u e s t i o n i n g
2 .1 ,  The Question-Based Topic Notion
The process of questioning in discourse which gives rise to scalar inferences 
presupposes a non-trivial relation between topic hierarchy and (hierarch­
ical) discourse structure. Central to this is the view that the organization 
of discourse segments is in agreement with the discourse-internal topic- 
comment structure which results from this questioning process. As is 
argued in Van Kuppevelt (1 9 9 1  and elsewhere), this implies that the topic 
of a discourse unit is determined by the explicit or implicit question it 
answers and that structural relations in discourse are defined by the 
relations between these topic-providing questions. The framework pre­
supposes a context-dependent and question-based topic notion which ac- 
counts for sentence topics and discourse topics in a uniform way.
By definition, a topic Tp is that which is being questioned by means of 
a contextually induced explicit or implicit question Qp, The corresponding 
comment Cp is provided by answer Ap. Cp is that which is asked for by 
Qp. If (the speaker assumes) Ap is sufficiently satisfying to that which is 
asked for, Tp is closed off. If not, as will be explained later, Ap will give 
rise to subquestioning.3,4
Topic Tp, that which is being questioned, is semantically characterized 
as the intension of the topic term in the syntactic analysis of the question, 
e.g, the intension of the one who is laughing functioning as the topic term 
in the syntactic analysis of the question given in (1).
(l)a. Qi Who is (the one who is) laughing?
W c O  =  - ?  
b. A x Alan is laughing.
u s act) = c x
In an ongoing discourse this topic term denotes a textually given or evoked 
discourse address for which no unique extensional counterpart exists in
2 For other question «based topic notions see, e.g., Bartsch (1976), Klein and Von Stut- 
terheim (1987), Stout (1986), and Vennemann (1975),
In the context of addressee-oriented discourse, implicit questions are defined as those 
questions the speaker anticipates the addressee asking as the result of the preceding context.
4 Elsewhere we present an outline of an algorithm for implicit question reconstruction (Van 
Kuppevelt 1991). Central to it is the reconstruction of implicit questions on the basis of 
certain formal characteristics of the (spoken) text, including accent distribution, specific 
syntactic structures like cleft and pseudo-cleft structures, and word order. However, a fully 
adequate reconstruction method also requires that other, not strictly (con)textual factors are 
taken into account, especially those related to the interaction of given contextual information 
and assumed background and situational knowledge.
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the contextual domain. Topic 7\ is the set of possible extensions of this 
term. Assuming that someone is laughing and assuming a contextual do­
main D = {Alan, Brian} this topic is defined as follows:
(2) Tx = {(Sl9 {Alan}), (S2, {Brian}), (S3, {Alan, Brian})}
A comment Cp, that which is asked for by the corresponding question 
Qp, is the extension Tp(Sact) of the topic term in the actual situation, e.g. 
the extension {Alan} provided by answer A i in (lb). This extensional 
value is selected by Ai from the topic set 7\. Question-answer pairs can 
thus be represented extensionally as in (1) in which the full answer Ai 
provides the actual extension of the topic term, namely (Sact, 7i(Sact)).5
2.2. Topic Ranges and Unique Determination
A central issue of the theory outlined here is that topic-forming questions 
are induced as the result of textually given or evoked indeterminacies or 
so-called question locations. If it is textually given, a question location is 
a non-uniquely referring term which, because of its referential ambiguity, 
is made the subject of questioning and, as a consequence of this, becomes 
a topic expression. At the moment of questioning the extension of this 
term, i.e. Tp(Sact), is (still) un(der)determined, implying that the actual 
topic range p'(Tp) of which Tp(Sact) is an element does not yet contain a 
unique value.
(3) Tp(Sact) G p'(Tp) \p'(Tp) \ >  1
The actual topic range p'(Tp) comprises the original or remaining set of 
possible extensional values Tp(Si) for the topic term in question. In case 
of example (2) p '(7i) is, at the moment of questioning, identical to the 
original topic range: p '(^i) “  {{Alan}, {Brian}, {Alan, Brian}}.
A reduction of the un(der)determinedness of the actual topic extension 
Tp(Sact) is realized by an answer to the corresponding question Qp. If 
satisfactory (and if no disturbance occurs in the questioning process), it 
involves the unique determination of Tp(Sact) .6 In that case the actual
5 Instead of a propositional account of questions and answers (e.g., Belnap 1982; Groenen- 
dijk and Stokhof 1984; Hamblin 1973; Karttunen 1977), we assume an individualistic one 
(e.g., Hausser 1983; Scha 1983; Tichjr 1978). The analysis is in agreement with the view 
explicit in, e.g., Belnap and Steel (1976) that the topic (‘subject’) of a question is a set of 
alternatives.
6 Other configurations of unique determination include those in which a satisfactory answer 
is inferred from an apparently unsatisfactory one and those obtained by topic narrowing and 
topic weakening processes (Van Kuppevelt 1994).
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topic range is reduced to only one value: |p'(Tp)| = 1. In the case of (lb), 
for example, the answer results in the unique determination Ti(Saci) E 
{{Alan}} (or: 7\(Sact) = {Alan}) of the actual topic extension.
The unique determination of the actual topic extension Tp(Sact) implies 
that the necessary condition for topichood, namely the un(der)determin- 
edness of a textually given or evoked question location, is no longer being 
met. This automatically results in topic closure. However, topic closure 
may also be forced as the result of an epistemic limitation on the part of 
the answerer, implying that he does not know a satisfactory, uniquely 
determining answer to the question. Such a situation is frequently marked 
by a phrase such as ‘All I know is t ha t . . ,  ’.
As will be explained in the next section, the state of unique 
determination is usually not reached in one step but involves all, or a 
considerable part of, the discourse. This is the case in hierarchically 
structured discourses underlying complex topic processes which necessarily 
involve answers to subtopic-forming subquestions.
2.3. Topic Hierarchy and Discourse Structure
2.3.1, Main Topic-Constituting Questions
The questioning process underlying the discourse production process con­
trols the development of the discourse and provides it with its mostly 
hierarchical segmentation structure and corresponding topic-comment 
structure. In this respect it is demonstrated that the main structure of a 
coherent discourse results from the contextual induction of two 
functionally different types of topic-forming questions, i.e. main, topic- 
-constituting questions and subtopic-constituting sub questions.7
Every main, explicit or implicit, topic-constituting question Qp is in­
duced as the result of a linguistic or non-linguistic feeder Ft . The function 
of a linguistic feeder Fi is to initiate or re-initiate the process of questioning 
in discourse. It may be a relatively large discourse unit or just a single 
sentence, e.g. the opening sentence of a discourse or a sentence which 
serves to continue the conversation when no more questions are induced 
by the preceding discourse. Together with associated background knowl­
edge a feeder Fi gives rise to a discourse topic DTt which, by definition, 
consists of all the main, higher-order topics constituted as the result of Fj,
Consider the following example in which a feeder gives rise to a
7 The distinction between main structure and side structure is accounted for in Van Kuppe- 
velt (1995b),
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relatively simple, non-hierarchical discourse resulting from just one main, 
explicit topic-constituting question.
(4)a. Fi A: A well-known subsidy book publisher is searching for
manuscripts.
Qx B: What kind of manuscripts?
Ai A: Fiction and non-fiction, 
b. Q x: What kind of manuscripts?
ri(5act) E { X \ X C  TYPES _ OF_M ANU S CRIPTS}
Ax: Fiction and non-fiction.
riOSac£) = {Fiction, Non-fiction}!8
Question Qx introduces an undetermined actual topic extension Ti(Sact). 
At the moment of questioning Ti(5act) is identical to one of the many 
possible combinations of types of manuscripts, as indicated by the topic 
range {X \ X  C TYPES_OF_MANUSCRIPTS}. The unique determination 
of Tx(iSact) is achieved here in a single step by means of answer Ax. It is 
assumed that Ax is a satisfactory answer because there is no epistemic 
limitation and no additional questions arise as the result of this answer.
2.3.2. Subtopic-Constituting Subquestions
If the answer to an explicit or implicit topic-constituting question is 
(assumed to be) unsatisfactory for the addressee, a (recursive) process of 
subquestioning involving the constitution of subordinate topics will be 
initiated. Processes of subquestioning are induced if the unsatisfactory 
answer has not resulted in a full reduction of the topic range implying 
that the information state consisting of the unique determination of the 
actual topic extension has not yet been reached.
Subtopic-constituting subquestions are contextually induced, in a recur­
sive way, as the result of unsatisfactory answers with the purpose of 
completing them to satisfactory ones. This completion function consists in 
achieving a further reduction of the underdeterminedness of the actual 
extension of the main topic (expression).
An explicit or implicit subquestion Qp is contextually induced as the 
result of a quantitatively or qualitatively unsatisfactory answer Ap_n given 
to a preceding higher-order question Qp_-n. In the former case the unsatis­
factory answer results in a quantitative underdeterminedness of the actual
8 In the analyses given topic closure is indicated by an exclamation mark.
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topic extension Tp_„(Sact), implying that the comment value provided by
is incomplete. In the latter case the underdeterminedness of 
Tp_n(S0ct) is of a qualitative nature, e.g. because Ap_„ is not specific 
enough.
Consider first the following variant of example (4).
(4)'a. Fi A: A well-known subsidy book publisher is searching for
manuscripts.
Qi B: What kind of manuscripts?
Ai A: Fiction and non-fiction will be considered.
Q2 B: What else?
A2 A: Poetry, juvenile, travel, scientific, specialized and even
controversial subjects, 
b. Qi: What kind of manuscripts?
Ti(5act) E [ X \ X C  TYPES_OF_MANUSCRIPTS}
Ai: Fiction and non-fiction will be considered.
Ti(5act) E {TtiSi) E p'(Ti) | {Fiction Non-fiction} C
U S , ) } 9 
Q2: What else?
r 2(S«t) £ { X \ X C  (TYPES_OF_
MANUSCRIPTS -  {Fiction, Non-fiction}) a  \X\ ^  1})
A2: Poetry, juvenile, travel, scientific, specialized and even 
controversial subjects.
TiC a^ct) -  {Poetry, Juvenile, Travel, Scientific, 
Specialized, Controversial subjects}!
7\(Sact) = {Fiction, Non-fiction, Poetry, Juvenile, Travel, 
Scientific, Specialized, Controversial subjects}!
The occurrence of question Q2 indicates that the inducing unsatisfactory 
answer Ai is unsatisfactory in a quantitative way. The determination of 
the actual topic extension 7\(£act) is now realized in two stages. First, the 
unsatisfactory answer Ai reduces the original undeterminedness of T t(S act) 
to a topic range containing only those (possible) extensions which include 
the incomplete value {Fiction, Non-fiction}. Second, answer A2 further
9 An unsatisfactory, incomplete answer A r is formally represented as A r\ Tr(S^zi) G 
{Tr( S & p*(Tr) \ Crr C Tr(5/)}, whereby C / is the comment value as mentioned in answer 
A r.
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reduces the set of remaining extensions to one unique value, implying the 
determination of the actual topic extension Ti(5act). After an answer has 
been given to subquestion Q2, not only topic Ti but also subtopic T2 is 
closed off. The actuality of the former is continued while subquestion Q2 
is being asked.
The following variant of (4) illustrates the contextual induction of a 
subquestion as the result of a qualitatively unsatisfactory answer.
(4)"a. Fx A: A well-known subsidy book publisher is searching for
potentially successful manuscripts.
Qi B: What kind of manuscripts?
Ai A: Only fiction.
Q2 B: What kind of fiction?
(I heard that the success of some types of fiction has 
been decreasing in recent months.)
A2 A: Both novels and short stories,
b. Qx: What kind of manuscripts?
riOS1^ )  e  { x \ x c  t y p e s ^ o f _ m a n u s c r i p t s }
Ax: Only fiction.
10TxiSnct) E X \ X C  FICTION a  \X\ ^  1}
Q2: What kind of fiction?
(I heard that the success of some types of fiction has been 
decreasing in recent months.)
r 2(Sact) E { X  | Z  C {Novels, Short sto ries,. . .}  a  \X\ ^  1} 
A2: Both novels and short stories.
T2(S&ct) -  {Novels, Short stories}!
TiCSact) “  {Novels, Short stories}!
As in the preceding case, the determination of the actual topic extension 
Ti(Sact) Evolves two steps. However, in this case answer Ax is unsatisfac­
tory because it is not specific enough,11 The unique determination of 
Tx(Sact) is achieved only after subquestion Q2 has been answered. Both 
in this and the preceding case the segmentation structure of the discourse
10 An unsatisfactory, non-specific answer A r is formally represented as A r: Tr(Sflct) £  
p[Tr(Si) E p(Tr) | Tr(Si) C Y  a  | r r(S/)| >  «}, whereby Y  and n are given by A r ,
11 In this paper we focus mainly on this type of qualitative underdeterminedness. Another 
type is discussed briefly in Section 3.3.1 and more extensively in Van Kuppevelt (1994).
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results from the process of questioning and is in agreement with the 
discourse-internal topic-comment structure.
Both types of subquestions are thus subservient to the process of answer­
ing a main, topic-constituting question. Inherent to their completion
function is the fact that the satisfactoriness of their answers depends on
i
the goal of the main, superordinating question.12 If this goal is satisfied, 
the answer to the subquestion is also satisfactory. Often, this implies that 
the satisfactory answer and, as a consequence, the topic range introduced 
by the corresponding subquestion are restricted, compared to what they 
would be in other, non-hierarchical contexts.13 Main, higher-order 
questions thus can give rise to so-called processes of topic narrowing and 
topic weakening, implying a quantitative or qualitative reduction of the 
topic range associated with the subquestion. Consider in this respect the 
following variant of Kempson’s (1986) example, analyzed here in terms 
of question-answer structure (angled brackets indicate the implicit charac­
ter of a question).
(5) Fi A: Fm a mother.
b
Qi Do I get a fixed amount of state benefit?
Ai B: If you have at least two children, you get a fixed
amount of state benefit.
(Q2) (How many children do you have?)
A2 A: I have two children. (In fact I have four.)
The example illustrates that a satisfactory answer to the implicit subques­
tion Q2 depends on the context, namely the higher-order, topic-constitut­
ing question Qi. Subquestion Q2 is subservient to Qi, the latter of which 
is satisfactorily answered for both A and B if they know if A gets a fixed 
amount of state benefit. This is already the case if they know that A has 
at least two children. An ‘exactly two’ interpretation of the cardinal in 
answer A2 would thus make this answer overinformative with respect to 
the functional needs defined by the main question.14 In other words, in
12 By definition, the goal of a  topic-constituting question is the requested final comment 
value to the main topic which it has introduced.
13 The context dependence of the notion of a satisfactory (uniquely determining) answer is 
illustrated in Van Kuppevelt (1991) and is*a central point of discussion in Van Kuppevelt 
(forthcoming).
14 In this respect Kempson (1986; 96-97) provides the following account in terms of Rele­
vance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986): . .  if the utterance in question [A2] is interpreted 
as involving, say ‘at least two’, it must be that this satisfies relevance in such a way that 
narrowing down the interpretation to the more precise ‘no more and no less’ interpretation 
would not increase the relevance . . . .  there is no number more relevant than 4two’, even if
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this example the main question Qi gives rise to a topic weakening process 
implying a qualitative reduction of the original topic range associated with 
subquestion Q2- Because of question Qi, this range consisting in the set 
of cardinal numbers {1, 2 , 3 , . . . }  is weakened to the set {<2 , 5*2} (or: 
{1, 2 v 3 v - ■ ■}) representing the same set of numbers in a less specific 
way. From this set the satisfactory answer A2 selects the ‘at least’ value
3. T o p i c s  a n d  L i n g u i s t i c  S c a l e s
3.1. Introduction
In Section 2 we gave a brief outline of the framework that accounts for 
discourse structure in terms of topic-forming questions. This section 
focuses on presenting an account of the phenomenon of scalar implicatures 
in terms of this theory. The presentation comprises both an account of 
scalar implicatures generated on the local level, i.e. those induced as the 
result of individual sentences for which a sentence topic is defined, and 
an account of scalar inferences associated with larger discourse units for 
which a higher-order topic or discourse topic is defined. As illustrated 
above, both the local and global structural levels are analyzed in a uniform 
way in terms of topic-forming questions.
Central to the argument in this section is the view that on each discourse 
level the generation of a scalar inference is determined by the explicit or 
implicit (sub)topic-forming question defining the particular level. First, in 
Subsection 3.2, we will put forward two claims in respect of these infer­
ences, one referring to their actual generation and the other to their 
inferential status. Second, in Subsection 3.3, we propose a definition of 
linguistic scales in terms of topic-forming questions. A  linguistic scale is 
characterized as an ordered topic range, providing scale values that share 
the same topic. We will illustrate how the definition provides a solution 
for the problems related to linguistic scales. Finally, in Subsection 3.4, 
we focus on the relationship between scalar inferences and discourse 
structure.
B [= A in our example] has a larger number of children” . As is obvious from our illustration, 
the phenomenon of the ‘at least two’ interpretation being optimally relevant is explained in 
this context by the fact that this value is already sufficient for satisfying the higher-order 
question, as a consequence of which a more specific exact value would be superfluous and 
thereby would violate Grice’s (1967/75) second submaxim of quantity which says “do not 
make your contribution more informative than is required (for the current purposes of the 
exchange)” .
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3.2. Scalar Implicatures Determined by Topic-Forming Questions
3.2.1. The Problem of Scale Activation in Elimination Contexts
Grice (1967/75) introduced two submaxims of quantity underlying cooper­
ative conversation. The submaxims express the principle of being neither 
underinformative nor overinformative. They are formulated as follows:
The Maxim o f  Quantity
(i) make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current
purposes of the exchange)
(ii) do not make your contribution more informative than is required
The first submaxim, the one giving rise to what is called Quantity-(i) 
implicatures, is central to our discussion. In this paper we focus on one
* * * * 15particular subclass, namely that of scalar Quantity-(i) implicatures.
Levinson (1983:106) explains the phenomenon of (scalar) Quantity-(i) 
implicatures in terms of the submaxim in question as follows:
Suppose I say:
(24) Nigel has fourteen children
I shall implicate that Nigel has only fourteen children, although it would be compatible with 
the truth of (24) that Nigel in fact has twenty children, I shall be taken to implicate that he 
has only fourteen and no more because had he twenty, by the maxim of Quantity (‘say as 
much as is required’) I should have said so* Since I haven’t, I must intend to convey that 
Nigel only has fourteen.
In other words, in agreement with the standard interpretation of quan­
tifying terms in first order predicate logic, the assertion that Nigel has 
fourteen children entails a lower bound that he has at least fourteen 
children, but pragmatically implicates an upper bound that he has no more 
than fourteen children. Semantic and pragmatic inference together result 
in the interpretation that Nigel has exactly fourteen children.16
Horn (1972) proposed the notion of linguistic scales underlying 
Quantity-(i) implicatures as conveyed in Levinson’s example given above. 
A linguistic scale is assumed to be activated or triggered by the quantifying 
term fourteen, This scale is a (linear) ordered set of alternative cardinal
15 We are conscious of the fact that another subclass of Quantity-(i) implicatures, called 
clausal implicatures, is also determined by topic-forming questions. For instance, the unsatis­
factory answer A believes p  given to the question Who is screaming?, whereby p  is ‘(The 
one who is screaming is) Bill*, gives rise to the clausal implicatures ‘possibly p 1 and ^possibly
ip*. These implicatures represent the corresponding set of possible answers {p, ~\p} to this 
question.
In this paper we abstract from the so-called property of the epistemic modification of 
pragmatic inferences (see, e.g., Levinson 1983 for a brief discussion of this subject).
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numbers, e.g. the finite set (16,15,14,13). The prediction of scalar infer­
ences on the basis of this scale is as follows. Given a scale and the assertion 
of a sentence containing a value on that scale, e.g. the assertion that Nigel 
has fourteen children, it is implicated that sentences containing a cardinal 
number higher on this scale, in this case the sentences that Nigel has 
fifteen and sixteen children, are negated.
An essential characteristic of implicatures is that they can be denied 
without a logical contradiction arising. The elimination of an implicature 
is achieved either explicitly, by means of an additional phrase or state- 
ment, or implicitly, as the result of the linguistic or non-linguistic context. 
As will be discussed in the next subsection, this possibility of elimination 
is generally considered to be a distinguishing property which expresses 
the status of implicatures as a weaker type of inference than (semantic) 
entailment.17
Using the above example we can illustrate the property of elimination 
without logical contradiction as follows.
(6) Nigel has fourteen children. In fact he has twenty.
The standard explanation is that the first utterance gives rise to the implica­
ture that Nigel has no more than fourteen children and that in the second 
utterance this implicature is explicitly cancelled.
Other types of implicature elimination given in the literature include:
(7) Nigel has fourteen children, if not more
(8) Nigel has fourteen children and maybe more.
In (7) and (8) the implicature that Nigel has no more than fourteen 
children is suspended both by the ^/-clause and the expression maybe 
more.
However, taking into account the topic-comment modulation of a sen­
tence, it is at least doubtful whether an implicature is actually generated 
in the supposed elimination processes. Consider the following question- 
answer pair.
(9) Who has fourteen children?
NigelCommc/i, has fourteen children. In fact he has twenty.
Given the question, the constituent Nigel in the answer has comment 
function. According to standard implicature theory, the second utterance
17 We assume a notion of semantic entailment as defined by Horn 1972, Gazdar 1979 and 
others, namely; p entails q when q is true under every assignment of truth values under 
which p is true.
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cancels the upper bound implicature associated with the quantifying term 
fourteen in the first utterance. However, no evidence exists for the assump­
tion that this implicature is generated at all and that it is followed by 
cancellation* The semantic interpretation of this sentence that Nigel has 
at least fourteen children is completely compatible with the assertion that 
he has twenty. It seems that in cases where the assumed implicature 
inducing expression is not part of the comment, implicature theory 
assumes, without evidence, two extra processes, namely a process of 
generation and one of cancellation. As will be demonstrated further in 
the next section, both processes are redundant given the semantic interpre­
tation ‘at least fourteen* of the lexical item of which it is assumed that it 
gave rise to the implicature.18>19 
However, based on the fact that questions are induced as the result of 
indeterminacies (Section 2.2), it is not only doubtful but even highly 
unlikely that a scalar implicature is generated at all in these cases. If in 
(9) a scalar implicature would have been induced as the result of the 
quantifying term fourteen, this would transform the semantically provided 
‘at least fourteen’ interpretation of this term into ‘exactly fourteen’ 
implying that this term is no longer an indeterminacy and that, as a 
consequence, question induction is blocked. Example (9)’ illustrates that 
this prediction is wrong.
(9)' Who has fourteen children?
Nigelcomfflem has fourteen children.
(How many children does he have?)
He has t w e n t y .
The answer that Nigel has fourteen children gives rise to the (implicit) 
question asking for the exact number. By definition, this question is only 
induced if the quantifying term fourteen is an indeterminacy the interpreta­
tion of which is ‘at least fourteen5 rather than ‘exactly fourteen’.
We will argue that a different implicature is induced in (9): not the 
quantifying term fourteen but the term Nigel gives rise to an implicature
18 A quantifying term like fourteen thus receives a monotone increasing interpretation if it 
has no comment status: adding more referents than fourteen does not change the truth value 
of the sentence containing this expression. In this paper we abstract from cases in which 
such a quantifying term represents an old comment value, implying that it got an ‘exactly n’ 
interpretation in the preceding context.
19 In this respect Kroch (1972) already noted that the notion of conversational implicature 
gives rise to a problem of overgeneration due to vague concepts which are difficult to test.
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because it has comment status.20 It denies all other candidates in the given 
context as the persons who have (at least) fourteen children. In other 
words, one of our criteria for implicature generation, and thus for scale 
activation (see also Section 3.4.1), is that the inducing context must have 
comment function.21
The importance of comment function for the generation of scalar im- 
plicatures, especially those induced as the result of cardinal numbers, has 
also been observed in Campbell (1981) and, extensively, in Fretheim 
(1992). According to Campbell, only when cardinals are in comment 
position do they always give rise to an ‘exactly n’ interpretation. However, 
in contrast to what is argued in the next section, it is assumed that this 
interpretation involves a pragmatic rather than a semantic inference of 
the type ‘no more them n \  According to Fretheim, on the other hand, 
cardinals within the ‘focus domain’ (i.e. those that are part of the com­
ment) get an ‘exactly rC interpretation of which the upper bound is given 
not by conversational implicature but is part of the linguistic meaning of 
the utterance itself. Only if a cardinal belongs to the background (topic 
part), is its upper bound pragmatically provided by conversational implica­
ture. Apart from the fact that no evidence exists for the assumption that 
in the latter case an inference is actually generated, the preceding example
(9)' illustrates that this possibility is ruled out by the simple fact that in 
such a case question induction is still an option. Furthermore, Fretheim 
leaves open the question as to whether there is also a linguistic scale 
activated in cases in which the cardinal is part of the comment. If so, it 
is not at all clear how such a scale differs from one activated by cardinals 
that are not in comment position. In the former case, as will be argued
20 As may become clear from our analysis of linguistic scales (Section 3.3.2) we do not adopt 
the position in respect of quantifying terms that they give rise to scalar inferences only if 
they do not belong to the comment part of the sentence (see, e.g., Seuren 1993).
21 Another strong argument supporting the view that the inducing context of inference must 
have comment function can be derived from the property of reinforceability (Sadock 1978, 
Levinson 1983), which says that conversational implicatures can be explicitly added to the 
inducing context without causing an unacceptable redundancy. Consider the following two 
question-answer pairs.
#  How many cookies did Billy eat?
Billy ate three cookies but not all.
Who ate three cookies?
Billy ate three cookies, but not all.
An (unacceptable) redundancy seems to occur only where an upper bound inference is 
actually generated, as is the case in the first pair. No such inference is generated in the 
second pair. This implies that the assertion that Billy did not eat all cookies does not have 
a redundant status.
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for in the next section, the scalar inference must be an entailment in 
agreement with the ‘exactly rC meaning of the cardinal, while in the latter 
case this inference is a weaker pragmatic one that can be cancelled. 
Furthermore, assuming that a linguistic scale is also activated in the case 
in which the cardinal belongs to the comment, it is unclear how such a 
scale has to-be defined, when we take into account that its elements 
constitute exact, mutually exclusive values that themselves exclude the 
one-sided ordering relation characteristic for linguistic scales.
The criterion for the generation of an upper bound scalar inference, 
namely that the inducing context must have comment function, obviously 
presupposes that the provided comment value is one that does not com­
prise the highest value on the associated linguistic scale. Satisfactory ans­
wers which provide an ‘exact’ value therefore usually give rise to an upper 
bound scalar inference. This is certainly the case when the ‘exact1 value 
does not constitute the end value on the associated linguistic scale. On 
the other hand, unsatisfactory answers that merely provide a less specific 
‘at least’ value do not give rise to such an inference, since the higher end 
value on the linguistic scale is included in the ‘at least5 value. However, 
as we will illustrate, in one specific case an upper bound scalar inference 
may also be induced as the result of an unsatisfactory answer, namely if 
such an answer merely selects a subrange of scale values excluding higher 
scale values.
The criterion, therefore, also accounts for the phenomenon of topic 
weakening by higher-order questions, as was illustrated above by 
Kempson’s (1986) example which is repeated here as example (10).
(10) Fi A: Tm a mother.
Qi Do I get a fixed amount of state benefit?
Ai B: If you have at least two children, you get a fixed
amount of state benefit.
(Q2) (How many children do you have?)
A2 A: I have two children. (In fact I have four.)
We argued that a topic weakening process is involved in this example, 
implying that the original topic range of subquestion Q2, i.e. p(T2) = 
{1, 2 , 3 ,. . .}, is reduced to pf(T2) = {<2 , ^ 2} as the result of the main 
topic-constituting question Qx to which subquestion Q2 is subservient. 
Because of the relationship between topic ranges and linguistic scales, a 
relationship that will be accounted for in detail in Section 3.3, the linguistic 
scale associated with the comment value in answer A2 is not . . ,  3 , 2 , 1) 
but the reduced linguistic scale (^2 , <2). However, in this case no upper 
bound scalar implicature is induced, because the comment value provided
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by the satisfactory answer A2, i.e. the value ‘at least two’ (‘5*2’), consti­
tutes the highest value on this scale. Although no upper bound inference 
is generated, answer A2 entails the corresponding sentence containing the 
lower value on this scale, namely if speaker A has at least two children,
i.e. two, three or more, A also has less than two children, namely one.
We already said that the criterion implies that no upper bound scalar 
implicature is generated as the result of unsatisfactory answers providing 
an ‘at least’ value. In this respect we distinguish two different situations 
of an unsatisfactory answer, namely one in which the unsatisfactory answer 
is completed by means of a process of subquestioning and one in which a 
satisfactory answer cannot be given because of an epistimic limitation.22 
Consider first the following analysis of an example presented by Horn 
(1992; 175), which illustrates the former situation.
(11) Qx A: (How many of your friends are linguists?)
Are many comment of your friends linguists? 
Ai B; Yes,
(Q2) (How many?)
A2 (In fact) ^comment of them.
In (11) answer Ax is unsatisfactory, given the succeeding extension A2 
which is considered to be realized by means of the implicit subquestion 
Q2. The comment value many which is confirmed by this answer must be 
interpreted as ‘at least many’, thereby comprising a set of higher ‘exact’ 
values on the corresponding linguistic scale. Given that the linguistic scale 
(all, most, many, some, few) is activated, the unsatisfactory comment 
value implies that a satisfactory answer to question Qx is either ‘(exactly) 
many’, ‘(exactly) most’ or ‘(exactly) air, implying that only the lower scale 
values some and few  are excluded as possible (‘exact’) answers to this 
question. Because the unsatisfactory answer provides an ‘at least many’ 
comment value ? no higher value is left as possible satisfactory answer to 
the question and, as a consequence, no upper bound scalar inference is 
generated. In Section 3.2.3 we discuss in greater detail the ‘at least many’-  
‘exactly many’ distinction and comparable distinctions. In addition, we 
provide a criterion for their identification.
As stated in Section 2 .2 , an answer may be unsatisfactory because of 
an epistemic limitation, namely if the knowledge of the addressee fails to 
provide a satisfactory answer to the question.
22 We will not discuss the situation in which the question process is broken off or disturbed 
in some other way.
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(12) Qi A: Which of the boys John, Andy and Martin went to the
match?
Ai B: All I know is that John and Andy went,
In (12) the provided comment value is ‘at least John and Andy1, which 
does not exclude the implied, stronger value ‘John, Andy and Martin’ as 
a possible (exact) answer to Ch. If answer Ai had been an exact answer, 
the latter value would have been excluded by means of an upper bound 
inference» An account of examples like these in terms of linguistic scales 
is presented in Subsection 3,3.3.
In very specific cases, answers that are unsatisfactory because of an 
epistemic limitation give rise to upper bound scalar inferences. But this 
happens only if the unsatisfactory comment value is not an ‘at least’ value. 
Consider the following two related examples,
(13) How many children does Nigel have?
Nigel has f o u r t e e n c h i l d r e n ,  if not fifteen^ ™ ^ , ,
(14) How many children does Nigel have?
Nigel has SgmtevnComment children and maybe fdtezncomment ■
Two points have to be mentioned in this respect. First, both answers are 
unsatisfactory because of an epistemic limitation, but they do not provide 
an ‘at least’ comment value. Therefore, they give rise to an upper bound 
scalar inference. Second, only the whole answers fourteen [. . if not 
fifteen and fourteen and maybe fifteen give rise to an upper bound scalar 
implicature, namely one excluding sentences containing scale values higher 
than fifteen. This is contrary to implicature theory which assumes an 
elimination process consisting of the suspension of the supposed implicat­
ure triggered by fourteen. However, this value is only part of the comment 
value provided by the sentence. As in the case of (9) there is no evidence 
for the assumption of two extra processes of generation and elimination 
of an implicature.
We can conclude here that upper bound scalar inferences while they
are generated as the result of comment values, this is only if these values
do not comprise the highest value on the associated linguistic scale.
Usually this is the case with satisfactory answers, because they provide an
‘exact5 comment value. Unsatisfactory answers mostly contain an ‘at least5
value. In such cases the generation of an upper bound inference is impos­
sible.
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3.2.2. Entailments Instead of Weaker Pragmatic Inferences
3.2.2.1. The ‘Elimination by Contradiction’ Cases. Horn (1972) 
distinguishes two ways of eliminating a scalar Quantity-(i) implicature: 
‘elimination by contradiction’ and ‘elimination by suspension1. In the for­
mer case the implicature is (explicitly) cancelled, implying that its truth 
value is denied. An illustration of this phenomenon is example (6) given 
above. In the latter case the implicature is eliminated on grounds other 
than its truth value, namely by ‘explicitly leaving the possibility open that 
a higher value on the relevant scale obtains5 (Horn 1989: 235), Examples 
of the latter type of elimination are (7) and (8), In this and the next 
subsection we will argue that what is considered to be an essential charac­
teristic of scalar Quantity-(i) implicatures, namely that they can be elimin­
ated without giving rise to a contradiction, does not hold in every situation. 
This supports the view that inferences of this type are in fact (semantic) 
entailments generated in specific contexts rather than weaker pragmatic 
inferences. The latter can, in principle, be induced in all contexts, though 
they may be the subject of explicit or implicit elimination.
It generally holds that if no correction is involved a semantic entailment 
cannot be cancelled without a contradiction arising.
(15) #Harry bought four books. In fact he bought three.
The second utterance in (15) contradicts the first one, both in its ‘exactly 
four’ interpretation which it has if the quantifying term four has comment 
status and in its ‘at least four’ interpretation if this term belongs to the 
topic part of the utterance.
In (16), on the other hand, no contradiction is involved in the cancella­
tion process. In this case the cancellation is a correction, implying the 
replacement of one value by another.
(16) A: Harry bought four books.
B: No, he bought seven.
But now consider the examples (17) and (18).
(17) Who bought four books?
Harrycomment bought four books. In fact he bought seven.
(18) [Harry did a lot of shopping this afternoon.]
How many books did he buy?
#H e bought four comment books. In fact he bought seven.
In contrast to example (17), the quantifying term four in (18) has comment 
status. As was argued for in the preceding subsection, it must give rise to
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an upper bound scalar inference, namely that Harry bought no more than 
four books. Evidence for the fact that this inference is actually generated 
is that if we assume the opposite the answer could not have been unaccept­
able, This is the case if a topic weakening process would have been 
involved, like in the following variant of (18).
(18)' [Did Harry get a free book in this shop?
If he bought four books, he got one.]
How many books did he buy?
VHe bought four comment books. In fact he bought seven.
As in (17), the assertion that Harry in fact bought seven books is compa­
tible with the lower bound interpretation of four in the first part of the 
answer.
The unacceptability of the answer in (18) demonstrates two points. 
First, it demonstrates that the cancellation of an upper bound inference 
cannot, as is generally assumed, be an essential property of scalar 
Quantity-(i) implicatures. Example (18) shows that the cancellation of 
such an inference may be blocked. Second, it demonstrates that if cancella­
tion is not possible it is blocked by a contradiction which implies that the 
upper bound inference that Harry bought no more than four books is 
entailed by the first part of the answer.
In (18) two types of entailments are associated with the quantifying 
term /our, the meaning of which is exactly four. The answer in which this 
term occurs entails sentences containing a lower value on the 
corresponding linguistic scale of cardinal numbers. However, because of 
the scale ordering, these values must be interpreted as ‘at least’ values 
instead of ‘exact5, mutually exclusive ones. If the number of books Harry 
bought is (exactly) four, it follows that he bought (at least) three or less 
books. Besides these entailments, the answer also entails the negation of 
sentences containing a value higher on the scale, e.g. the negation of the 
sentence that Harry bought (at least/exactly) five books. Inferences of the 
latter type are upper bound scalar inferences which, in our opinion, are 
incorrectly characterized in pragmatic theory as a weaker type of infer­
ence. They differ from lower value inferences in the fact that they cannot 
can be inferred in all circumstances independent of the topic-comment 
modulation of the sentence. Both Harry bought four comment books and 
Harrycomment bought four books entail that he bought (at least) three, 
two, etc. books, but only the former statement entails that he did not buy 
more than four books.
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The phenomenon described here can also be demonstrated by yes/no- 
questions with an underlying WH-question.23,24
(19) [Who bought four books?]
Did Harry comment buy four books?
Yes, in fact he bought five.
(20) [Harry bought a lot of books.
How many books did he buy?]
Did he buy four comment books?
#Yes, (in fact) he bought five.
The answer in (20) is unacceptable because, in contrast to the answer in
(19), it involves a contradiction due to the fact that, first, an upper bound 
inference is induced as the result of the confirmation of the comment 
value four in the question and, second, this inference is an entailment.25
Summarizing so far we can say that an upper bound scalar inference in 
fact is a context dependent inference that is not induced under all topic- 
comment modulations of the inference inducing sentence. This inference 
is an entailment and not a weaker pragmatic inference which can be 
cancelled without causing a contradiction.
23 We do not adopt Campbell’s (1981) distinction between phenic (effortful) and cryptic
(automatic, effortless) processes in identifying the generation of a scalar inference. Whether
an upper bound scalar inference is generated at all in the case of, e.g., the yes/no-question
Did Harry buy four books? is considered to be a phenic, effortful process, while whether
one is generated in case of the answer Four given to the corresponding WH-question How
many books did Harry buy ? is considered to be a cryptic process involving no real effort on
the part of the questioner. According to our criterion a scalar inference is generated if the
inference inducing element has comment function. However, in discourse this function is
intonationally and/or contextually marked, implying that in principle no extra effort is needed
to determine the existence of a scalar inference.
«  i
This type of yes/no-question is intonationally and syntactically accounted for elsewhere 
(Van Kuppevelt 1991).
The observation that context plays a crucial role in the actual generation of inferences of 
this type is anticipated in Horn (1972) and also observed in Scharten (forthcoming). Horn 
(1972: 33):
(1.63)a. Does John have three children?
b. Yes, (in fact) he has four.
c. No, he has four.
As in the case of the examples (17), (18) and (18)’ the yes/no-question is, in our view, 
ambiguous between one that underlies the question Who has three children ? and one that 
underlies the question How many children does John have? This ambiguity is intonationally 
marked by the main accent on different constituents in the question, namely on John and 
three respectively.
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3.2.2.2. The *Elimination by Suspension’ Cases. A special category of 
constructions causing the elimination of a scalar Quantity-(i) implicature 
are the suspension cases. The examples given include those of the 
following syntactic form (see Horn 1972/89).
(21) (at least) Pl5 if not (downright) Pj
Pi, {or, and possibly} even Pj
not even Pi5 {let alone/much less} Pj
(Pj and Pj are elements of the same linguistic scale such that
Pj > P i)
According to the standard explanation the suspending clauses containing 
the scale values Pj eliminate the implicatures induced as the result of the 
lower scale values P*. Though the final inferential outcome is that in fact 
no inference is induced as the result of Pi5 there is no evidence for the 
assumed generation and cancellation processes as we have said above 
(Section 3.2.1). However, as already indicated by Horn (1989), there is 
another reason that supports the view that such an assumption is redund­
ant. The value Pd which it is assumed gives rise to an implicature is not a 
stable one as compared to other values which certainly give rise to an 
implicature, This value is merely a part of the under determined, non­
unique value expressed by the construction as a whole. In the context of 
the suspension construction P i5 if not P j, this means that either Pi or Pj is 
the case. In other words, as long as it is not known whether Pi is the case, 
it is unlikely that an inference would be induced as the result of it.
Characteristic for the elimination by suspension cases is that the whole 
and not just a part of the construction constitutes an answer to a topic- 
forming explicit or implicit question. Consider the following two question- 
answer pairs.
(22) How many books did Harry buy?
Harry bought fouiComment books, if not Sver ^ ,
(23) [Someone of my group bought no less than four books,]
Who bought four books?
#  Harry comment bought four books, if not five.
Compared to (23) the acceptability of the answer in (22) demonstrates 
that the suspending clause if  not five is part of the underdetermined, non­
unique comment value provided by the whole answer.26
The view that the whole suspension construction and not just a part of
26 We abstract here from so-called echo questions like Who bought four if not five book?
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it constitutes the comment is further supported by the phenomenon of 
multi-comment sentences. Consider in this respect example (23)' which, 
in contrast to (23), is an acceptable (part of) discourse.
♦
(23)' [I would like to know who bought how many books.]
Who bought trnicommeni books?
VHarryComment bOUght fG]X£.Cornment books, if HOt fivecnrp-mpnt ♦
Suspension constructions must, therefore, be distinguished from con­
structions such as m an y .. . in fact all which cannot be interpreted as 
constituting one comment value. As shown by our preceding example
(11), these constructions comprise an intervening explicit or implicit 
subquestion, implying that two -  completing -  comment values are in­
volved .
If a suspension construction gives rise to a scalar inference at all, it is 
generated as the result of the whole construction (‘Pl? if not P /), and not 
just the non-suspending part of it (Ti5) . The status of the latter is not a 
definite answer providing a unique comment value, but is merely an 
answer providing a possible comment value out of the range of comment 
values defined by the whole answer given to the question, e.g. the range 
of possible comment values {4, 5} in the case of example (22).
Suspension constructions as a whole give rise to an implicature, only if 
the upper bound of the selected range of possible comment values lies 
before the upper bound of the whole range associated with the question. 
For instance, if in (22) the question were to define the finite (topic) range 
{4,5, 6}, the answer which selects the subrange {4,5} would give rise to 
the implicature that Harry did not buy six books.
3.2.2.3. G azdafs (1979) Arguments, Gazdar (1979) offers two arguments
to support the view that scalar Quantity-(i) implicatures cannot be entail- 
ments. We will demonstrate that neither argument can be upheld when 
viewed contextually, particularly not if we take into consideration the 
topic-forming explicit or implicit question answered by the inference in­
ducing sentence.
The first argument, which we call the cancellation argument, has in 
fact been discussed earlier in another way. Consider the following set of 
sentences.
(24)a. Some of the boys were at the party.
b. Not all of the boys were at the party.
c. Some, in fact all, of the boys were at the party.
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Gazdar’s cancellation argument goes as follows: the relation between the 
a-sentence and the b-sentence cannot be an entailment, for entailments 
cannot be cancelled (without contradiction) and the c-sentence shows that 
cancellation of the inference is quite possible. However, the argument 
cannot be sustained if the quantifying terms in the a-, b- and c-sentence 
occur in comment position. In such a case the quantifying term some in 
the c-sentence does not give rise to a scalar inference as in the a-sentence 
and, consequently, no cancellation process is involved. In the c-sentence 
this term does not constitute an ‘exact’ value but an unsatisfactory 'at 
least’ value which is completed by the in fact all phrase. An analysis of 
this situation is given in (24)'.
i
(24)'c. How many of the boys were at the party?
Some, (how many?) in fact all, of the boys were at the party.
But now consider the following set of sentences relevant to Gazdar’s 
second argument. We will call this argument the inconsistency argument.
(25)a. Some of the boys were at the party.
b. Not all of the boys were at the party.
c, All of the boys were at the party.
In this case the argument is one of reduction ad absurdum. The c-sentence 
entails the a-sentence. If the a-sentence would entail the b-sentence, then 
(by transitivity) the c-sentence would entail the b-sentence which, of 
course, cannot be the case since the one sentence contradicts the other. 
Therefore, the a-sentence cannot entail the b-sentence.
The argument becomes invalid if we take into account the topic-com- 
ment modulation of the sentences. Let us first suppose that in each sen­
tence the quantifying value in sentence initial position has comment 
function, e.g. by considering it to be an answer to the topic-forming 
question How many o f the boys were at the party? There are (at least) 
two situations in which this argument becomes invalid. First, the entail­
ment relation between the c-sentence and the a-sentence does not hold if
• f c
all values are interpreted as ‘exact’ answer values: if the number of boys 
at the party were all of them, theft this number is not some of them. 
Second, as is generally assumed, the c-sentence entails the a-sentence, 
implying the following: if the number of boys that were at the party were 
all of them, then this number is at least some of them. However, this non­
exact value in the a-sentence implies that this sentence does not entail the 
b-sentence.
If, on the other hand, in each sentence the constituent at the party has 
comment function, no evidence is available to support an inference
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relation between the a-sentence arid the b-sentence. We have already seen 
that no cancellation process involving such an inference takes place in the 
following cases.
(26)a. Where were some of the boys?
b. Some of the boys were at the party, in fact all.
The ‘at least’ interpretation of the quantifying term some in the answer 
comprises the possible exact answer value all, as a consequence of which 
the inference between the a-sentence and the b-sentence is blocked.
3.2.3. Extending the Analysis to Non-Cardinals
Central to the preceding subsections was the hypothesis relating to the 
topic dependency of the generation of upper bound scalar inferences* We 
saw that these are induced as the result of sentence parts representing 
comment values, but only of those parts which do not comprise the highest 
value on the associated linguistic scale, Therefore, comment values which 
represent an unsatisfactory ‘at least’ value, i.e. those which are completed 
as the result of subquestions as well as those which involve an epistemic 
limitation, do not give rise to such an inference. Furthermore, comment 
values constituting a satisfactory answer that comprises the highest scale 
value are also excluded from generating such an inference. However, in 
the preceding subsections we have concentrated mainly on cardinals. In 
this subsection we show that the hypothesis also relates to upper bound 
scalar inferences induced as the result of non-cardinals, whereby we espe­
cially pay attention to the problems observed in the literature. Consider 
the following examples.
(27) (iall, most, many/much, some)
a. Qi How much of the profit does John get?
Ai Muchctfmmern Of it. (HOW much?) In fact most C om m ent*
b. Qi Who got much of the profit?
Ai John (How much?) In fact he got most comment-
(28) (and, or)
a. Qi What would you like to drink? Would you like
tea or coffeer^ww„„,?
Ai Yes, (Which of the two?) both comment please.
b. Qi Who would like tea or coffee?
Ai John comment (Which of the two?) In fact he would like
b o t h rV>mm/?Mf •
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(29) {certain, almost certain, pretty likely, likely, possible)
a. Qi How likely is it that John will decide to enrol for this
major program?
^  Pretty likely comment • (How likely?) In fact it is 
almost certainrv,w„,.„,.
b, Qx Of which student is it pretty likely that he will decide to
enrol for this major program?
Ax It is pretty likely that John comment will decide to enrol for 
this major program. (How likely?) In fact it is 
almost c e r t a i n .
In the answers of all the a-parts an unsatisfactory comment value is com­
pleted to a satisfactory one by means of an (implicit) subquestion. The 
hypothesis predicts that no scalar inference is induced as the result of the 
unsatisfactory answers, but solely as the result of the satisfactory ones. 
However, as is also predicted by the hypothesis, the satisfactory answer 
‘both’ in (28a) forms an exception, because it represents the highest value 
on the associated linguistic scale.
As is the case with the unsatisfactory answers in the a-parts, the values 
much, tea or coffee and pretty likely in the b-parts also represent an ‘at 
least* value and, as predicted, do not give rise to an upper bound scalar 
inference. However, unlike the unsatisfactory answers in the a-parts, they 
represent an ‘at least* value because of the fact that they do not have 
comment status.
In contrast to our position, Carston (1985/88) provides an analysis of 
cardinals which implies that cardinals must be distinguished from non­
cardinals. The author argues against the standard ‘at least5 semantics of 
cardinals in favor of a so-called neutral semantics. According to Carston, 
the linguistic meaning of cardinal predicates is not ‘at least n \  Depending 
on the context, i.e. both the linguistic context and the non-linguistic 
context containing background knowledge, these predicates get an ‘at least 
n \  ‘at most n’ or an ‘exactly n’ interpretation. Carston’s view is supported 
by, among others, the following examples which imply, respectively, a 
standard, non-linguistically determined ‘at least5 and ‘at most5 interpreta­
tion.
(30) You don’t have to be (at least) sixteen to drive a car; you have
to be (at least) eighteen.
(31) She can have (at most) 2000 calories a day without putting on
weight.
However, as demonstrated by the following variants analyzed in terms of









question-answer structure, an upper bound scalar inference is also 
generated in these cases, depending on the question answered.
How old do you have to be to drive a car in Holland?
In Holland you have to be eighteen to drive a car.
In which country do you have to be sixteen to drive a car? 
In Holland. (How old then?) You have to be eighteen.
How many calories a day can Jane have without putting 
on weight?
Jane can have 2000 calories a day without putting on 
weight.
Who can have 2000 calories a day without putting on 
weight?
Jane. (How many can she have?) In fact she can have 2800 
calories a day without putting on weight.
Only the answers in the a-parts give rise to an upper bound scalar infer­
ence. In contrast to those in the b-parts they contain a cardinal in comment 
position. The scalar inference induced as the result of the answer in (30a)' 
is that in Holland you don’t have to be (at least) nineteen or older to 
drive a car. The one generated as the result of the answer in (31a)' is that 
Jane cannot have, e.g., (at most) 2500 calories a day without putting on 
weight.
Apart from these examples, Carston further underpins her claim with 
examples in which the ‘at least7‘at most’ interpretation is not standardly 
given by background knowledge, but by contextual factors, Consider the 
following example presented by Carston.
(32) If Mrs. Smith has no more than three children, we’ll all fit into
the car. She does have (at most) three children.
Obviously, as in our preceding example (5), a topic weakening process is 
involved in this example, The linguistic scale associated with this example 
is (>3, ^3). Apart from the fact that the cardinal in the second sentence 
receives an ‘at most7 interpretation, it also gives rise to the generation of 
an upper bound scalar inference, namely that Mrs. Smith does not have 
more than three children.
We can conclude that Carston’s observations do not form an exception 
to our central hypothesis relating to the generation of upper bound scalar 
inferences. In this respect the ‘at least «’- ‘exactly rC distinction can, in 
principle, be preserved. As demonstrated by the examples (27), (28) and
(29), the ‘at least rt interpretation is obtained if the cardinal is not in
420 JAN VAN K U P P E V E L T
comment position, while the ‘exactly n’ interpretation holds if it has com­
ment status. However, as may be clear from these and previous examples, 
this distinction has to be interpreted in terms of un(der)determinedness 
and determinedness respectively.
Apart from Carston’s analysis, other arguments are given in the 
literature to account for the special status of cardinals. Most of these 
arguments are discussed in Horn (1992) who provides, among other things, 
a defense of the standard theory of scalar implicatures. We will discuss 
briefly some of these arguments and demonstrate that the behavior of 
cardinals and non-cardinals is predicted in a uniform way by our 
hypothesis.
As Sadock (1984) has argued the truth conditions of mathematical 
statements require that the cardinals involved have ‘exact4 meanings rather 
than ‘at least5 meanings as is implied by standard implicature theory. The 
problem is that a mathematical statement such as, ‘2 + 2 = 35 would be 
true if the cardinal ‘3’ would mean ‘at least 3’, However, the behavior 
of the arguments of two-place predicates like ‘+ 5 and ‘= ’ involved in 
mathematical statements is in agreement with cardinals, in ordinary state­
ments when they are in comment position. These arguments typically
i
express a determined, specified quantity like cardinal numbers in comment 
position, e.g. the cardinal number three in Edgar has three cars as an 
answer to the question How many cars does Edgar have? For that reason, 
a mathematical statement such as 2 -f 2 = 4 must be analyzed as an answer 
to the three-fold question How much plus how much equals how much? 
or, depending on the context, as an answer to, e.g., the reduced one-fold
question HOW mUCh iS 2 C o m m e n t  plUS 2 C o m m e n t ?
Similar to cardinals in mathematical statements, those that are lexically 
incorporated, such as the cardinals in the words ‘triangle’ and ‘quad­
rangle’, always have an ‘exactly ri meaning rather than an ‘at least n' 
meaning (e.g., Horn 1972 and Hirschberg 1985). For example, the cardinal 
three incorporated in ‘triangle’ specifies the number of angles of the 
denoted object, thereby defining uniquely this geometric figure. For this 
reason, this cardinal must be interpreted as answering an incorporated 
‘how many’-question and, accordingly, ‘triangle’ must be interpreted as 
‘how many’-angled figure5.
As Horn (1972) and others have argued, cardinals constituting an ap­
proximative value are more likely to be interpreted as non-inference in­
ducing ‘at least’ values, e.g. as is the case in ‘John has $200’ as compared 
to ‘John has $201.37’. It is said that this phenomenon does not occur with 
non-cardinals. However, our hypothesis implies that approximations do 
not have a special status and that they answer the general rule of implicat-
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ure generation. If in comment position, an approximative value is either 
an unsatisfactory answer completed by a process of subquestioning to a 
satisfactory, more precise, value or a satisfactory answer resulting from a 
process of topic weakening.
A remarkable observation concerns the relationship between collective 
and distributive readings on the one hand, and 'exactly n’ and *at least rC 
meanings on the other hand (e.g., Atlas 1990 and Horn 1992). Compare 
the following two sentences presented in Horn (1992).
(33)a. If there are three books by Chomsky (in the shop), I ’ll buy
them all.
b. If there are three books by Chomsky (in the shop), Fll buy 
each of them.
In the a-sentence, which involves a collective reading, the cardinal three 
is interpreted as ‘exactly three’, while in the b-sentence, which represents 
a distributive reading, this cardinal has an ‘at least’ meaning. As shown 
in (33)', this observation is fully explained by our hypothesis which implies 
that cardinals are not distinct from non-cardinals in this respect.
(33)'a. Qi How many books by Chomsky will you buy’?
Ax If there are three books by Chomsky (in the shop), I’ll 
buy them all.
b. Qi Which books will you buy?
Ai If there are three books by Chomsky (in the shop), I’ll 
buy each of them.
In contrast to answer A x in the a-part, Ai in the b-part cannot be 
interpreted as answering a ‘how many’-question. So, only in the former 
case the cardinal represents a comment value, and for that reason is 
interpreted as ‘exactly three’.
The last argument to be mentioned here -  that cardinals in comment 
(‘focus’) position are given a purely semantically provided ‘exactly ri 
interpretation -  has been extensively discussed in previous sections, 
namely as has been defended, in particular, by Fretheim (1992). We 
have already explained how this analysis differs from our own analysis. 
However, as Horn (1992) has argued, Fretheim’s position would imply that 
cardinals should be distinguished from non-cardinals which, in comment 
position, may also receive an ‘at least5 interpretation. It follows from our 
hypothesis that, in this respect as well, cardinals do not have a special 
status. Like non-cardinals, cardinals in comment position may be given 
an ‘at least’ interpretation. This was demonstrated by Kempson’s example 
(see example (5)) which we analyzed as a topic weakening process. On
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the other hand, as has also been shown, the ‘at least5 interpretation of 
non-cardinals that have comment status is the result of unsatisfactory 
answers. This implies that non-cardinals, e.g. the quantifying terms some, 
many and most, may receive two interpretations in discourse, namely an 
‘at least5 interpretation and ‘exact5 interpretation. An illustration of this 
phenomenon is the preceding example (27) in which the answer containing 
the quantifying term ‘(at least) much5 is completed to one containing 
‘(exactly) most5. Only the latter gives rise to an upper bound scalar infer­
ence which is expressed by a corresponding sentence containing the value 
‘not all5. If no epistemic limitation is involved, quantifying terms such as 
‘many5 must be interpreted as ‘exactly many’, unless the less specific 
interpretation ‘at least many’ does not imply underinformativeness, as is 
the case if an answer is completed by means of subquestioning or its topic 
reduced by a process of topic weakening.
Once again we conclude that there is no principle difference between 
the behavior of cardinals and non-cardinals with respect to the central 
hypothesis concerning the generation of scalar inferences. If no weakening 
process is involved, cardinals differ from non-cardinals only in the fact 
that, without explicit mentioning, they always represent an ‘exact’ value 
when functioning as a comment.
3.3. Linguistic Scales as Ordered Topic Ranges
In Section 3.2 we discussed two characteristic properties of scalar 
Quantity-(i) implicatures and we argued for topical restrictions on their 
generation as well as for an essential change of their inferential status. It 
was shown first that the actual generation of an implicature of this type 
depends on the topic-forming explicit or implicit question that is answered 
in the inducing context and, second, that such a topic-based inference is an 
entailment and not, as is generally assumed, a weaker pragmatic inference. 
Obviously, both the topical restrictions and the assignment of a different 
inferential status affect the nature of this type of pragmatic inference.
In this section attention will be directed to the topical basis of linguistic 
scales underlying inferences of this type. First, we will discuss three prob­
lems that have blocked the formulation of an adequate definition of linguis­
tic scales, namely that of scale ordering, scale coherence and scale reduc­
tion. After that, we will propose a definition of linguistic scales in terms 
of the question-based topic notion given above. This definition supplies 
an integrated solution to these issues, including a solution to the problem 
of scale activation that underlies the determination of topical restrictions 
on scalar inferences.
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3.3.1. The Problem o f  Scale Definition
3.3.1.1. Scale Ordering and Scale Coherence. Central to the discussion of 
a definition of linguistic scales are the generally acknowledged problems 
of scale ordering and scale coherence. The absence of an adequate solution 
to these problems has led many authors (e.g., Horn 1972, Gazdar 1979, 
Levinson 1983) to adapt a position of taking linguistic scales as given, 
coherent sets of values ordered by semantic entailment.
Obviously, all the authors consider some ordering to be a necessary 
condition for linguistic scales. However, as is pointed out by Fauconnier 
(1975a), Hirschberg (1985) and Horn (1989), this ordering does not 
necessarily have to be an entailment relation. Consider in this respect 
Fauconnier’s pragmatic scales. As in cases in which a scale ordering is 
defined by entailment, the upper bound inferences based on pragmatic 
scales are also entailments.
(34) A: What is the heaviest weight Alexei can lift?
p
B; Alexei can lift a weight of 80 pounds.
If the heaviest weight Alexei can lift is 80 pounds, it follows by entailment 
that he cannot lift a weight higher on the associated scale. However, no 
entailment relation exists between sentences containing a value on this 
scale. The sentence that Alexei can lift a weight of 80 pounds does not 
entail that he can lift a lighter one, e.g. because of its shape, form, etc.
Or, consider Hirschberg’s (1985) example.
(35) A: Did you get Paul Newman’s autograph?
B: I got Joanne Woodward’s.
In the appropriate context B’s answer entails that he did not get the 
autograph of a famous person higher on the scale than Joanne Woodward, 
thus excluding the given alternative Paul Newman. But the sentence that 
B got Joanne Woodward’s autograph does, obviously, not entail that he 
actually also got one of a less.famous person.
Other illustrations supporting the vieto that entailment cannot be the 
only ordering principle for linguistic scales are cited in Horn (1972/89). 
Among others, he gives the following illustration containing the suspen­
sion construction Pt, if not Pj.
(36) In the Netherlands the crowds [for the Pope] were small, the
welcome lukewarm if not cold. (New York Times, 19 May 
1985)
Apart from the fact that more ordering principles than entailment must
424 JA N VAN KTJPPEVELT
be assumed for linguistic scales, a general ordering criterion underlying 
all of them is still missing. In addition, ordering as a necessary condition 
for linguistic scales is clearly not a sufficient condition. Among the prob­
lems discussed in the literature are those which may be called the hierachy 
problem  of scales, the problem of scale overlap, scale direction and scale 
partitioning. All the problems make it clear that an additional criterion 
for linguistic scales defining the set of scale values as coherent is needed.
The hierarchy problem deals with the part-whole relationship between 
elements on a linguistic scale. According to Hirschberg (1985) this relation­
ship must be salient in discourse in order to give rise to scalar implicatures.
Consider in this respect the following example.
i
(37) Qi A: Did Bill eat all the cake?
A i B: (No,) he ate some of it.
Given that the associated linguistic scale is (a ll,. . . ,  some, . . . ) ,  answer 
Ai gives rise to the upper bound inference that Bill did not eat all the 
cake.
However, while salience is clearly a necessary condition it is not a 
sufficient one. Though (all , . . .  , som e,. . . )  is an acceptable linguistic 
scale, . ,  Amsterdam, Holland,. . . )  or (. . . ,tulips, flowers,. . , )  may 
not be considered a linguistic scale, despite the existence of one-sided 
entailment relations between the elements involved. Consider example
(38).
(38) Qi A: Does Ed live in Amsterdam?
A i B: (I know) he lives in Holland.
Answer A x is unsatisfactory, defining a range of possible answers of which 
Amsterdam is one, as the result of which no scalar inference is induced. 
Obviously, an epistemic limitation is involved in this example.27 But consi­
der (38)5 in which this possibility is excluded.
(38)' Qi A: Do you live in Amsterdam?
At B: I Uve in Holland.
Also in this case no scalar inference is generated, as appears from the fact
27 As will become clear later4 our prediction with regard to (38) is in agreement with Grice 
(1975: 51-52) who discusses a comparable example. Grice argues that in the case of an 
epistemic limitation the first submaxim of Quantity, implying not to be underinformative, is 
violated in favor of the maxim of Quality saying ‘Don’t say what you lack adequate evidence 
for’. In other words, the prediction with respect to the answer in (38) is that it implicates 
that B does not know in which town Ed is living.
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that a continuation of the discourse such as Do you live in Amsterdam , 
or elsewhere? is quite acceptable.
The linguistic scales (warm, lukewarm) and (cold, lukewarm) partially 
overlap, leaving open the criterion of what exactly combines with the 
value lukewarm in a given context. The point is illustrated in Horn (1989: 
547, n.25).
(39) My beer is lukewarm, if not downright {warm/#cool}
My coffee is lukewarm, if not downright {cold/#hot}
The problem of scale direction applies to linguistic scales which do not 
differ in the set of values they provide but in the direction of the one­
sided ordering relation defined on this set. Consider example (40).
(40) a. Pete drinks five whiskies a day.
b. Pete cut down his drinking to five whiskies a day.
The cardinal number five in both the a- and b-sentence may give rise to 
scalar inferences consisting in the negation of values higher on the scale. 
However, as already argued by Horn (1972), the associated scales are 
different. If the scale associated with the a-sentence is ( . .  . ,6, 5 , 4 , . .  .), 
the one related to the b-sentence is the reversal scale ( . . . , 4 , 5 , 6 , . . . ) .  
In the former case the scalar inference is that Pete does not drink more 
than five whiskies a day, while in the latter case it can be inferred that 
Pete did not cut down his drinking to less than five whiskies a day.28
Finally, let us consider briefly the problem of scale partitioning. A  clear 
illustration of this phenomenon are natural scales, in particular tempera­
ture scales. Temperature scales as a whole do not form a coherent linguis­
tic scale but have to be split up in order to become one. For instance, the 
temperature scale (. . . ,hot, warm, cool, cold,. .  .) is not a coherent 
linguistic scale because it is divided into both warm and cold graduations. 
The absence of coherence between these values is expressed, for example, 
by the fact that if something is hot it is also warm but certainly not cold. 
The criterion of scale coherence is met, when split up in the partial scale 
, hot, warm,..  .) and the (reverse ordered) partial scale {. . .  , cold, 
cool , . .  .).
In Section 3.3.2 we will give a general coherence criterion for linguistic 
scales in terms of topics and topic-forming questions. This criterion ac-
28 The notion of scale reversal is not adopted in Hirschberg (1985), who argues that scale 
orderings are not defined over their elements but over events which involve them. According 
to our proposal in Section 3.3.2, this ordering is defined over possible answers to explicit or 
implicit (sub)topic-forming questions.
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counts for the problems mentioned above. However, first we discuss 
briefly another problem related to the definition of scales, namely that of 
scale reduction.
3.3.1.2. Scale Reduction. Part of the problem of scale definition is the 
difficult, though hardly discussed problem of scale reduction. It refers 
directly to the principal question of defining the contextual constraints on 
the number of values that constitute a linguistic scale. As indicated by 
others (e.g., Rooth 1992), such constraints are needed in particular to 
avoid an overgeneration of scalar inferences. For instance, the realization 
of a value n on a scale gives rise to the inference that all (sentences 
containing) higher values n + k (k >  0) on that scale do not obtain, Ob­
viously, this may imply a serious overgeneration of scalar inferences if 
the set of scale values is a contextually unrestricted one, semantically 
determined by all possible domain values of the same type.
Central to the argument, therefore, is the problem of defining contextual 
constraints on the domain entities that in specific cases can function as 
scalar values. In this respect the notion focus o f attention and its relation 
to discourse structure is directly relevant. Obviously, entities constituting 
scale values must be in focus of attention. As demonstrated by Grosz 
(1978), Reichman (1978), Grosz and Sidner (1986) and others, the set of 
discourse entities in focus of attention is a variable set the content of 
which changes in agreement with the structure of discourse, However, 
what is the relation of this with the notion of topic-forming questions? 
We have seen how the generation of scalar implicatures is determined by 
such questions. Though the authors presuppose that a topic is defined for 
each discourse segment, a formal and operational definition of this notion 
explicating its relation with that of focus of attention and discourse 
structure is not given.
In the next section we will characterize a linguistic scale as an ordered 
topic range bringing into focus of attention an (ordered) set of entities 
which function as possible extensional values for a questioned un(der)det- 
erminacy. Scale reduction which results from a reduction of such a topic 
range is considered to be a function of the completion task associated with 
subtopic-forming subquestions. At the highest structural level in discourse, 
the set of entities in focus of attention is therefore given by the original, 
contextually unreduced topic range introduced by a main, higher-order, 
topic-forming question. This range is limited due to subquestions induced 
at lower levels.
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Our proposal for linguistic scales that accounts for the view that scalar 
inferences are contextually determined entailments starts from the 
following definition which relates the notion of linguistic scales to the 
notion of topic-forming questions.
Scale Definition. A set of values STp constitutes a linguistic scale iff it 
meets the following two conditions:
(i) Condition o f  Coherence. The values of STp share the same topic Tp. 
They constitute possible answers (comments) to the same topic-forming 
question Qp. These values represent either satisfactory or less specific, 
unsatisfactory answers to this question. In the former case the values are 
identical to those of the actual topic range p'(Tp) consisting of ‘exact5, 
mutually exclusive answer values. In the latter case they form less specific 
‘at least’ values in terms of which the ‘exact* values are grouped.
(ii) Condition o f Ordering. In contrast to the topic range p'(Tp) consisting 
of ‘exact’ answer values, the linguistic scale STp is a (partially) ordered set 
the ordering of which implies that the values from p'(Tp) are organized in 
terms of non-uniquely determining ‘at least’ values. These values do not 
possess the property of mutual exclusiveness, i.e. the property that the 
value selected by a satisfactory answer to Qp excludes all other scale 
values.
A linguistic scale STp is thus considered to be a (partially) ordered actual 
topic range p'(Tp): STp = (p'(Tp), ^). As will be explained, the scale 
ordering ^  is uniformly defined in terms of answer informativeness, com­
prising both semantic and pragmatic orderings of the type illustrated 
above.
According to the definition, the actual topic range p'(Tp) consists of 
‘exact’, mutually exclusive answer values. In STp these ‘exact’ values are 
ordered in higher (‘stronger’) and lower (‘weaker’) values implying an 
ordering in terms of corresponding, less specific ‘at least’ values. If, for 
instance, a scale value ‘3’ is stronger than a scale value ‘2’ this means that 
‘3 is at least 2’, implying that the satisfactory answer to question Qp is 
either ‘2’ or ‘3’ (or a higher number). As shown in (41c), such a scale 
ordering is expressed by inclusion relations between the ‘at least5 values 
comprising the corresponding ‘exact’ values.
3.3.2. The Proposal
(41) a. Qi A: How many books does John have to read for the exam,
two, three, four or even more books?
Ai B; John has to read three books for the exam.
b. Topic range Qx:
p'iTy) =  {2 ,3 ,4 , .  . .}
c. Linguistic scale Q i :
STl = <{ . . . ,  4,3,2},  3t)
= { . . . ,  4,3,2}





(41b) shows that the topic range defined by question Q x is; p'(7\) = 
{2,3 ,4 , , .  It is an unordered set containing mutually exclusive (‘exact’) 
answer values of which one is selected by the satisfactory answer Ai. If 
the number of books John has to read for the exam is exactly three, it 
follows by entailment that this number is neither two nor four, nor more. 
The corresponding linguistic scale STl, on the other hand, is an ordered 
set which is derived from the topic range p'(7\) and which gives rise to 
‘at least’ values: if the number of books John has to read for the exam is 
(exactly) four, the number of books he has to read is also at least three 
and also at least two. As is usual in implicature theories which only 
consider total orderings, we will represent this scale as an ordered n-tuple 
in the following way: STl = , 4,3,2) ,
The definition of linguistic scales accounts for the generation of scalar 
inferences in the following way, In (41) the satisfactory answer Ai selects 
the exact comment value ‘3’ on the linguistic scale STl introduced by 
question Ch. This implies that the number of books John has to read for 
the exam is at least and at most three. ‘At most three’ then gives rise to 
the scalar inference ‘not at least four (. . . ) ’, implying the upper bound 
scalar inference that John does not have to read exactly four or more 
books. However, answer Ai also gives rise to an inference with respect 
to the lower value on STl, namely the entailment that if John has to read 
(exactly) three books for the exam he also has to read (at least) two 
books. Obviously, no upper bound scalar inference would be induced if 
the anwer to question Q* were a less specific, unsatisfactory answer, e.g. 
the answer that John does not have to read exactly but at least three 
books.
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The scale definition provides a uniform ordering principle for linguistic 
scales in terms of the general notion of answer informativeness.29 As 
demonstrated earlier (Section 2) complex answering processes are 
determined by a stage-like reduction of the un(der)determinedness of the 
actual extension of the main topic (expression). This reduction implies a 
reduction of the associated topic range, realized by subquestions. Answers 
to subquestions make a preceding unsatisfactory answer more informative,
i.e. more specific. This increase of answer informativeness consists in 
excluding values as possible answers to the main question. The same kind 
of answer informativeness holds for linguistic scales as a uniform ordering 
principle.
The general ordering principle in terms of answer informativeness 
implies that higher scale values are more informative (more specific) than 
lower values in the sense that they exclude more possible answers as 
satisfactory answers to the question. First, as is obvious, ‘exact5 answer 
values representing a unique value are more informative than lower ‘at 
least5 values involving more than one of such a value. Second, higher ‘at 
least5 values are more informative than lower ‘at least5 values. They ex­
clude more possible satisfactory answers to a question than lower ‘at least’ 
values. In (41) the non-specific scale values (at least) two , (at least) three 
and (at least) four give rise to the following sets of possible satisfactory 
answers to question Ch; {2, 3 , 4 , . . . } ,  {3 ,4 , . .  .} and {4 , . . . } .  The possible . 
answer at least four, e.g., is more specific than at least three. The former 
excludes as possible (satisfactory) answers to the question the values two 
and three, while the latter excludes only the value two. Clearly, the ‘exact5, 
mutually exclusive values on the scale are all equally informative, It holds 
that every such value excludes all other ‘exact5 values on the scale.
The definition of linguistic scales contributes, in a direct way, to a 
solution of the problem of scale activation. We have already talked about 
a necessary condition for scale activation which is now formulated as 
follows; given a discourse unit Uj, no other linguistic scale is activated 
than the one which can be derived from the topic defined for this unit, 
namely topic T| determined by the explicit or implicit question Qi that is 
answered by Uj. The linguistic scale activated in (41), e.g., is derived from 
the topic defined by question Qi, in particular the topic range p'(7i) that 
is introduced by this question. However, if the topic-forming question Qi 
had been Who must read three books for the exam, John or both John and
29 The notion of answer informativeness referred to here differs from Levinson’s (1983) 
notion of scale informativeness which implies scale orderings to be defined by semantic 
entailment.
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his wife? quite a different scale would have been activated, namely S T* = 
({John, John’s wife}, {John}). The analysis implies that if the quantifying 
term three in the answer does not represent a comment value, no scalar 
inference is generated on the basis of this term.
The condition for scale activation described here is a necessary but not 
sufficient one* A comment value may involve a corresponding linguistic 
scale, though this is not necessarily the case. Another condition for scale 
activation is provided by the scale definition, namely that the ‘exact5 values 
constituting the topic range can be ordered in terms of less specific, ‘at 
least’ values. Consider in this respect Hirschberg’s (1985) example, to 
which we have added two different implicit questions, only one of which 
gives rise to a linguistic scale.
(42) a. (Qi) A: (Who is the most famous movie star from whom you
got an autograph?)
Did you get Paul Newman’s autograph?
Ai B: I got Joanne Woodward’s, 
b, Linguistic scale S Tl = {PN}, {JW},. . .)
(42)'a. (Qi) A: (From which movie star did you get an autograph?)
Did you get Paul Newman’s autograph?
Ai B: I got Joanne Woodward’s, 
b. No linguistic scale defined
In contrast to (42), answer A x in (42)7 does not give rise to an (upper 
bound) scalar inference, No linguistic scale is defined here, implying the 
absence of higher and lower values. Though in both cases it is inferred 
that B did not get Paul Newman’s autograph, the main inferential differ­
ence between the two examples is that only the answer in (42) does not 
exclude lower values, namely that B got an autograph from some movie 
star lower on the scale, i.e. someone less famous than Joanne Woodward. 
However, this possibility is absent in case of (42)'. The answer entails 
that B didn’t get an autograph from any other movie star, so also not 
from someone more or someone less faftious than Joanne Woodward.
The definition also provides a solution for the other, earlier mentioned 
problems related to scale definition, namely the hierarchy problem, the 
problem of scale overlap, scale direction and scale partitioning. Each of 
these constitutes a problem of scale coherence implying that the first 
condition of the definition is not met. In none of the cases the scale values 
can be interpreted as values sharing the same topic defined by an explicit 
or implicit topic-forming question,
Unacceptable linguistic scales exhibiting the hierarchy problem, as is
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the case with the linguistic scales #(Amsterdam, Holland) and #(tulips5 
flowers) given above, consist of values identical to answers to questions 
which differ from each other in the amount of specificity of the possible 
answers that can be given. For instance, Amsterdam  and Holland  cannot 
be answers to the same topic-forming question, as is demonstrated by 
the following unacceptable alternative question: #W here do you live, in 
Amsterdam or Holland? The same holds for the unacceptable linguistic 
scale #(tulips, flowers); #W hat did you buy , tulips or flowers? In other 
words, in addition to salience as a necessary condition (see above) we add 
the mutual exclusiveness of the answer values as a sufficient one.
In the case of partial scale overlap the criterion on the basis of which 
a scale value coheres with the overlapping value in a given context is 
unclear. This problem was illustrated in (39) in the context of the partially 
overlapping linguistic scales (warm, lukewarm) and (cold, lukewarm). This 
problem is now explained as follows. The two overlapping scales are 
introduced by different topic-forming questions. The coherence condition 
(i) is not met if the ‘wrong5 question is associated with the scale inducing 
sentence. Consider once again example (39), repeated here as example
(43).
(43)a. How warm is your beer5?
My beer is lukewarm, if not downright {warm/#cool} 
b. How cold is your coffee?
My coffee is lukewarm, if not downright {cold/#hot}
Contrary to example (39) the sentences in (43) are placed in a context of 
two appropriate, though different, topic-forming questions. Changing the 
questions would result in incoherent values.
Obviously, the problem of scale direction implying, as demonstrated 
above, a reversal of scale ordering can also considered to be the effect of 
different topic-forming questions. The a-sentence in (40), namely Pete 
drinks five whiskies a day> is an appropriate answer to the question How  
many whiskies a day does Pete drink? The b-sentence, on the other hand, 
answers a different question, e.g. To how many whiskies a day d id  Pete 
cut down his drinking? -  Pete cut down his drinking to five whiskies a day .
Finally, we discussed the coherence problem of scale partitioning occur­
ring, e.g., in relation to temperature scales. The temperature scale 
( . . .  , hot, warm, cool, cold, . .  .) is not a coherent linguistic one because 
its values cannot be interpreted as possible answers given to the same 
topic-forming question. Answers corresponding to elements on the partial 
scale (. . . ,hot, warm,..  .) answer a ;How warm'-question, while those
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corresponding to the partial scale (. . . , cold, cool , . . .) answer a reverse
‘How cold1-question.
In addition to the problem of scale ordering, scale activation and scale 
coherence, we also pointed out the important issue of scale reduction by 
contextual factors. Our criterion for contextual constraints on linguistic 
scales is given by the completion task associated with subtopic-forming 
subquestions. As argued above, these questions imply a stage-like reduc­
tion of the topic range associated with a higher-order topic-forming 
question. As a consequence, they realize a reduction of the linguistic scale 
derived from this range.30 Example (44) gives a simple illustration of 
the contextual reduction of a linguistic scale in a process of subquestioning.
(44) Qi A: How much can you pay?
($85, $90, $95, $100, $105,
$110 or more) S Tl = {. , .  , $110, $105, $100,
$95, $90, $85)
Ax B: Less than $100. S Ti' = ($95, $90, $85)
Q2 A: $95?
A2 B: No, that’s too much. S Tl" = ($90, $85)
Q3 A: How much then?
A3 B: $90.
Reduction of the linguistic scale S Tl corresponds to a reduction of the 
corresponding topic range
3.3.3. Partially Ordered Topic Ranges as Linguistic Scales
So far, we have only considered linguistic scales as linear ordered sets 
which are conventionally represented as n-tuples. However, in practice 
partially ordered sets are more common than these total orderings. The 
former contain both related and unrelated, so-called comparable elements. 
As pointed out by Hirschberg (1985), we need to broaden the notion of 
scalar inferences to arrive at one which also accounts for inferences based 
on these partial orderings.31 Our definition of linguistic scales given above 
accounts for inferences of this type in terms of partially ordered topic
30 •Obviously, this reduction only concerns higher scale values, because the lower ones 
represent at least values entailed by those selected by the (un)satisfactory answer.
^  H _
Despite the fact that early implicature theory concentrates on total orderings, the phenom­
enon of scales as partial orderings has not been unobserved. For instance, Gazdar (1979: 
58, n. 22): “Note that treating scales as n-tuples obscures the fact that, in general, we are 
dealing with partial rather than total orderings” .
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ranges introduced on different discourse levels by an explicit or implicit 
topic-forming question.
As a brief illustration consider the question Qr:Who complained? asked 
in a context which is unrestricted by discourse structure and in which only 
the set of persons A  ~  {Al, Boris, Conrad} is relevant. Assuming that 
someone did complain, the corresponding actual topic range is defined as 
follows; pr(Tr) — { X \ X Q A  a  \X\ ^  1}. The related linguistic scale is a 
partially ordered set derived from this topic range; S Tr =  (p'(7V), ^). It 
does not meet the condition of linearity characteristic for total orderings, 
namely that for all x , y  E A: x ^ y  or y ^ x .  In (45) the partially ordered 
linguistic scale S Tr is visually represented by a Hasse diagram.32
(45) a. Qr: Who complained?
Linguistic scale Qr:
S Tr ~  ({X\ X C  {Al, Boris, Conrad} a  |A| 3* 1}, &)
Hasse diagram o f  S Tr:
{Al, Boris, Conrad}
The diagram shows the structure of ordered sets which is of a hierarchical 
nature.
As in the case of total orderings, the partial ordering implies that the 
‘exact’ values on the scale are organized in terms of ‘at least5 values: 
higher ‘exact5 values entail lower ‘at least’ values, For instance, if answer 
Ar to question Qr is that both Al and Boris complained, it follows by 
entailment that at least Al and at least Boris complained. However, answer 
Ar also gives rise to an inference consisting of the negation of the sentence 
which realizes a value higher on the scale, namely that all three persons 
complained. This upper bound scalar inference implies that it was not 
both Al and Conrad who complained, not both Boris and Conrad, nor
32 See, in particular, Partee, ter Meulen and Wall (1990) on this point.
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extended answer. Second, contrary to what might be expected, this does 
not imply that the moment of induction takes place directly after the 
production of this discourse part. We present two inference rules needed 
for adequately computing a global scalar inference.
In Section 3.4.2, on the other hand, brief attention will be paid to the 
phenomenon of local scalar inferences discussed above, in particular to 
their behavior in hierarchical topic processes. We will discuss local scalar 
inferences resulting from both quantitatively and qualitatively unsatisfac- 
tory answers, looking, in particular, at their relation to global scalar 
inferences.
3,4.1. Determination o f  Global Inferences: The Inducing Context and the 
Moment o f Induction
Global scalar inferences are determined either by a part of the extended 
answer or the answer as a whole. We first consider the situation in which 
a global scalar inference is generated on the basis of the whole answer. 
In such a situation the extended answer consists of a quantitatively unsatis­
factory answer providing an incomplete comment value and an elaboration 
on it providing the remaining value(s). Together, these partial comment 
values constitute the requested final comment value on the basis of which 
a global scalar inference is generated. The generation of a global scalar 
inference as the result of the whole answer occurs in our example (4)' 
given above which is repeated here as example (46).







The insufficient answer Fiction and non-fiction together with the complet­
ing answer Poetry, juvenile, travel, scientific, specialized and even contro­
versial subjects provide the final comment value that determines the 
higher-order upper bound scalar inference associated with this discourse 
unit. This upper bound scalar inference consists of the negation of sen­
tences containing a scalar value higher on the linguistic scale introduced 
by the main question Qi, namely those comprising a superset of the set 
of manuscripts referred to by the extended answer.
But, now consider again our earlier example (4)", here example (47).
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 A  well-known subsidy book publisher is searching for 
potentially successful manuscripts,
 What kind of manuscripts?
 Only fiction.
 What kind of fiction?
(I heard that the success of some types of fiction has 
been decreasing in recent months.)
 Both novels and short stories.
In contrast to the preceding example, (47) involves an extension of a
qualitatively unsatisfactory answer. In this case the upper bound scalar
inference associated with the extended answer to the main question Qt is
determined by only a part of this answer, namely the answer Both novels
and short stories (will be considered) given eventually by answer A2. It
entails the less specific unsatisfactory answer Fiction will be consideredft
which may be deleted without loss of inferential force on the global level. 
It provides the final comment value to the topic introduced by question 
Qi and, as a consequence, gives rise to the upper bound scalar inference 
on the global level.
In (47) the inference determining part of the answer comes at the end, 
though this is not always the case in answering processes involving a 
qualitative extension of an unsatisfactory answer. As argued in Van Kup- 
pevelt (1994), an answer may be qualitatively unsatisfactory not because 
it is insufficiently specific, as is illustrated in (47), but because it has not 
yet been fully accepted by the addressee and therefore calls for support, 
e.g. a justification. In the latter case the part of the answer that finally 
determines the global scalar inference is not located at the end of the 






 A well-known subsidy book publisher is searching for 
manuscripts.
What kind of manuscripts?
Fiction will be considered.
Are you sure about this?
Yes, (Why?) someone told me.
Answer A x is unsatisfactory as appears from subquestion Q2. It is not yet 
fully accepted by questioner B and calls for a justification, which is given 
in A2. In this case not A x but A2 may be deleted without loss of inferential 
force on the global level. Answer A i provides the final comment value
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determining the scalar inference associated with the extended answer to 
the main question Qi-34
So far, our conclusion is that the upper bound scalar inference associated 
with an extended answer to a higher-order topic-forming question is 
determined either by the complete answer, in the case of an quantitatively 
unsatisfactory answer, or by just a part of it in the case of the answer being 
qualitatively unsatisfactory. As illustrated above, this part is presented at 
the beginning or the end of the answering process. The following inference 
rule concerning the computation of scalar inferences at the global level 
provides the generalization that is needed.
Inference Rule 1: When computing a global scalar inference associated 
with a discourse unit answering an explicit or implicit higher-order 
question, the computational input which actually determines this inference 
is the final comment value to the topic defined by this question.
In (46) the final comment value is provided by the complete answer to 
the main question, while in (47) and (48) it is given in, respectively, the 
first part (Ai) and last part (A2) of the extended answer to these questions. 
These parts, in particular, cannot be deleted without a loss of inferential 
force, since they satisfy that which is asked for by the main question.
Although a global scalar inference is determined by the part of the 
extended answer that provides the final comment value, the moment that 
such an inference can be determined is always just after the whole answer 
to the question has been given. Premature determinations may give rise 
to false predictions. For instance, if in (46) the global scalar inference 
were to be determined while considering the quantitatively unsatisfactory 
answer A t as being the one providing the final comment value, a contradic­
tion would arise. The prediction would be an upper bound scalar inference 
contradicting the answer given to subquestion Q2, namely the inference 
that the publisher in question is not also searching for manuscripts of 
Poetry, etc.
More interesting is the premature determination of a global scalar infer-
34 As accounted for extensively in Van Kuppevelt (1994), the phenomenon illustrated in 
(46), (47) and (48) is that of directionality. The phenomenon is called nuclearity in Rhetorical 
Structure Theory (e.g., Mann and Thompson 1988), and, as explicated in Moser and Moore 
(1993), is directly related to the notion of dominance central to the intentional approaches 
of discourse structure (see, in particular, Grosz and Sidner 1986). It refers to the property 
of (a part of) a text to be directed toward a goal, mostly resulting in asymmetric functional 
relations between related discourse segments. We can distinguish three types of directionality 
occurring in (46), (47) and (48), namely bi-directionality, forward directionality and backward 
directionality.
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ence in case of (48). Answer Ai in fact provides the final comment value 
to the topic introduced by the main question Qi. However, the global 
inference must be computed at the end, namely after answer A2 has 
been given. The justification this answer provides may be denied by the 
addressee and, as a consequence, would rule out that A x provides the 
final comment value.
The conclusion, therefore, is that in determining global scalar infer­
ences, the inference rule relating to the inducing context given above does 
not suffice. In addition to this rule we need one relating to the moment 
of induction, namely the following:
Inference Rule 2: When computing a global scalar inference, the moment 
of computation must be just after the whole answer has been produced. 
This moment does not necessarily coincide with the moment of realization 
of the final comment value.
Thus inference Rule 2 implies that scalar inferences must be computed 
after segment closure which coincides with the moment that the full answer 
to the main question has been realized.
3.4,2, Determination o f  Local Inferences in Hierarchical Contexts
In the preceding section we focused on the determination of global scalar 
inferences, characterized as inferences induced as the result of extended 
answers given to higher-order topic-forming questions. We argued that 
the computation of such inferences necessarily requires the identification 
of that part of the answer which provides the final comment value to the 
topic defined by the higher-order question. As illustrated, this value is not 
necessarily provided by the whole extended answer given to this higher- 
order question. The global scalar inference is computed by determining 
the inferential output of this value with respect to the linguistic scale 
activated by the higher-order question.
In this last section we briefly discuss the determination of local scalar 
inferences which are generated on-line in the discourse process and which 
directly contribute to a scalar inference on the global level. Obviously, 
the inferential result of locally induced scalar inferences is identical to a 
global one associated with an extended answer. As compared to global 
inferences, this type of inference results from non-extended answers, e.g. 
incomplete and non-specific answers as well as individual extensions given 
to such answers. They result from the comment values provided by these
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answers and are computed with respect to the linguistic scale associated 
with the local question answered by the non-extended answer. Because 
inferences of this type were extensively discussed in previous sections, we 
will now pay attention only to how they relate to global scalar inferences.
Let us consider in this respect two typical variants of our preceding 
example in which an answer is given to the question Who complained?. 
It is assumed again that this question is asked in the context in which only 
the set of persons A  = {Al, Boris, Conrad} is relevant. The first variant 
involves a qualitative extension of an unsatisfactory answer to this 
question, namely one which contributes to the non-specific answer.
(49) a.
Qi B; Who complained?
Ai A: Two persons.
Q2 B: Which two persons?
A2 A; Al and Boris.
The unsatisfactory answer A* reduces the topic range p'(Ti) to the set of 
possible answers {{Al, Boris}, {Boris, Conrad}, {Al, Conrad}}. The local 
scalar inference induced on the basis of this answer consists only of the 
negation of (the sentence containing) the highest value {Al, Boris, Conrad} 
on the corresponding scale S T%.
b. -{A ly Boris, Conrnd) -
Together with the local scalar inferences induced as the result of the 
answer given to subquestion Q2 this inference amounts to an inferentional 
result that is identical to that implied by the scalar inference on the global 
level. This was presented in (45b).
The second variant consists of the completion of a quantitatively unsatis­
factory, partial answer.
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(49)'a.
• « V
Qa B: Who complained?
Ai A; A1 in particular.
Q2 B: Who else?
A2 A; Boris
In this case, the unsatisfactory answer A i reduces the original range of 
topic Ti to the actual topic range pr(T i) = {{AI, Conrad}, {AI, Boris}, {AI, 
Boris, Conrad}}. However, no local (upper bound) scalar inference is 
generated as the result of this incomplete answer. The linguistic scale 
S Tl which is derived from p'(7i) still contains the strongest possible value 
{AI, Boris, Conrad} implying that no lower (‘at least’) value on the scale 
is excluded at this stage in the development of the discourse. Answer A2, 
on the other hand, gives rise to an inferential result which is identical to 
the one implied by the upper bound scalar inference on the global level.
4 .  C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we proposed an alternative definition of linguistic scales 
accounting for the generation of what is generally known as scalar implicat- 
ures. The proposal was stated within a topical approach of discourse 
structure explaining the structural coherence in discourse in terms of topic- 
forming explicit or implicit questions. According to the central hypothesis 
of this approach, the topic of a discourse unit is provided by the topic- 
forming explicit or implicit question answered by that unit, while the 
relation between (hierarchically organized) discourse units is determined 
by the relation between these topic-forming questions. It has been demon­
strated that by relating the notion of linguistic scales to that of topic- 
forming questions it is possible to compute the scalar inferences associated 
with different discourse levels, thereby going beyond an account of locally 
induced scalar inferences which is standard in pragmatic theory.
We have presented evidence for the view that scalar implicatures, both 
those induced as the result of cardinals and those induced as the result of 
non-cardinals, are in fact determined in a uniform way by topic-forming 
questions. We discussed the important issue of over generation of scalar 
inferences as well as that of the inferential status of inferences of this 
type. As far as overgeneration is concerned, we claimed that so-called 
upper bound scalar inferences are not induced under all topic-comment 
modulations of the inference inducing question-answering sentence, but 
only as the result of what forms the comment part of this sentence in a
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given context. However, a given comment value may be unsatisfactory 
and a question may be functionally subservient to a higher-order one 
involving a weakening of the topic introduced by it. We illustrated that 
in both cases an upper bound scalar inference may be blocked. As to the 
inferential status of scalar inferences, we have argued that they are seman­
tic entailments rather than weaker pragmatic inferences which in principal 
can be cancelled without giving rise to a contradiction. In this context 
we have discussed both Horn’s (1972) ‘elimination by contradiction’ and 
‘elimination by suspension’ cases and Gazdar’s arguments against a purely 
semantic treatment of these inferences.
Scalar inferences associated with higher- or lower-order discourse units 
are generated on the basis of linguistic scales introduced by topic-forming 
questions defining these units. A linguistic scale is defined as a (partially) 
ordered topic range. This definition made it possible to provide adequate 
solutions to problems related to scale definition, including the problems 
of scale activation, scale reduction, scale ordering and scale coherence. 
Furthermore, the definition gave rise to an explanation of the way in 
which upper bound scalar inferences induced at the local level contribute 
to global ones.
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